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RESUMEN
+Son las leyes que protegen a los accionistas minoritarios una condicio´n
necesaria para el desarrollo de los mercados de capitales? Este ensayo intenta
responder esta pregunta usando datos sobre los orı´genes de las sociedades
ano´nimas en Chile para desarrollar un ana´lisis empı´rico de las condiciones
contractuales incluidas en los estatutos de estas empresas durante el siglo XIX.
Se muestra que, pese a que la legislacio´n chilena no incluı´a normas referidas
a gobierno corporativo y proteccio´n a accionistas minoritarios, durante este
periodo se desarrollo´ un mercado activo. El ana´lisis empı´rico revela que los
estatutos de las sociedades ano´nimas frecuentemente incluı´an cla´usulas que
establecı´an derechos para los inversionistas minoritarios y que el uso de estas
cla´usulas contractuales es consistente con las predicciones de un modelo de
agencia simple.
Palabras clave: Chile, gobierno corporativo, derecho de sociedades
1. INTRODUCTION
There is an extensive literature in economics that shows that financial
markets matter for economic development. Therefore, a key question is:
what factors allow financial markets to emerge and develop? In particular,
are formal legal rules and regulations necessary conditions for the develop-
ment of stock markets or, in their absence, can other mechanisms such as
private contracts or reputation support the growth of equity markets?
This paper focuses on the problem of minority investor protection. When
investing in a corporation, a small shareholder faces the risk of being subject
to expropriation by the party in control of the firm. Without any explicit
rights or mechanisms of control, investors will be reluctant to provide funds
to corporations, hindering the development of stock markets and limiting the
growth possibilities of the economy. Is legal-based investor protection the
only way to solve this problem or can private contracts providing such
protection be used to mitigate the agency problems faced by corporations
and therefore allow the development of a capital market?
However, providing additional protection to investors might reduce the
ability of a firm to pursue new projects and therefore be costly. What
factors determine investor protection when it is offered at a firm level?
This paper addresses these questions using evidence from corporations in
19th century Chile.
In two influential papers, La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) (LLSV) study how
different legal systems impact financial market development. Using current
data from a cross-section of forty-eight nations, they conclude that countries
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with legal systems of French origin (civil law) have lower levels of investor
and creditor protection than countries with English legal systems (common
law) and that this lower level of protection has a negative impact on financial
market development. Their research has had an undeniable impact in both
academic and policy discussions1.
Other studies, however, have challenged the LLSV argument showing
that the robustness of their conclusions depends on the time frame con-
sidered. Rajan and Zingales (2003) analyse the level of development of
financial markets in 1913 and conclude that in many continental European
countries (civil law) the level of financial development was higher than in the
United States (common law). While their results were questioned subse-
quently, the evidence available tends to suggest that there is no favourable
difference to common law countries at the beginning of the 20th century2.
In a related line of research, Pistor et al. (2002, 2003) pointed out that the
main factor explaining financial underdevelopment is not legal origin per se,
but how a country develops its legal system. They classify countries in two
groups: those that developed their formal legal order internally (origins) and
those that received their formal legal order from abroad (transplants) and
argue that the way in which a country received its legal regime is a more
important determinant of the current efficiency of its legal institutions than
the legal family the country belongs to. In the specific case of corporate law,
they find that transplant countries are less efficient at adapting their rules to
changes in the business environment over time. Their conclusion is that the
«transplant effect» is the critical element that explains the underdevelopment
of the law and the financial system.
By focusing on the contents of the law, both La Porta et al. and Pistor
et al. implicitly assume that firms always choose the lowest level of investor
protection. However, if the law also gives corporations flexibility in terms of
organisation, the approach of focusing on the letter of the law can produce
a distorted picture of the «real level» of investor protection in the economy.
If the law gives firms a great deal of freedom in terms of their organisation,
how did the organisers of corporations choose governance rules? More
specifically, what level of investor protection did they choose?
This paper analyzes the provisions included in the charters of corpora-
tions formed in Chile during the second half of the 19th century. During that
period, Chilean corporate law was silent in regards to the rights of minority
investors. Any rights given to corporate investors at the time should have
been recorded in each firm’s corporate charter (a contract that specifies the
1 The research of La Porta et al. is recognised as the starting point of the «law and finance»
literature. For a recent survey of the topic, see La Porta et al. (2008).
2 See La Porta et al. (2008) who argue that the results obtained by Rajan and Zingales are
distorted by the presence of outliers and have methodological errors. Sylla (2006) shows that their
approach underestimates the size of the U.S. market in 1913. On the other hand, Musacchio (2010)
presents data more supportive of the argument of Rajan and Zingales.
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internal governance mechanisms of a firm and the rights and duties of the
different stakeholders). In order to investigate whether such protection was
granted, I collect Chilean corporate charters from 1854 to 1902.
Chile is an interesting case for analysis because it was a country that
laboured under a civil law regime based on the French legal system (i.e. a
«transplant country» in the classification of Pistor et al.) and because its
incorporation statutes (drafted in 1854 and not subject to significant changes
throughout the 19th century) were silent regarding investor protection and
corporate governance. I investigate the following research questions: did the
contractual protection included in charters provide a substitute for regu-
lation? Is it possible to identify the determinants of the degree of investor
protection at a firm level?
I find that even though corporate law at that time was silent with respect to
governance rules and investor protection, a significant number of corporations
were created and they were able to raise significant resources from out-
side investors. Corporate charters frequently included provisions favourable
to minority investors and the use of these provisions is consistent with the
predictions of a simple agency model. That is, more protection was given
to minority investors when the potential for agency problems was greater and,
therefore, protection was more valuable to investors. These results show
that an analysis that focuses solely on the letter on the law cannot provide a
complete answer regarding the causes of stock market development.
This paper also makes a contribution to Chilean economic historiography.
Chile obtained its independence from Spain in 1818. After a decade of institu-
tional anarchy, Chile was able to consolidate its institutions and insert itself into
the world economy with a development strategy characterised by an emphasis
on trade and exports of basic materials. The second half of the 19th century was
a period of relatively fast growth, driven first by agriculture (wheat) and then
mining (silver, copper and, later in the century, nitrates). It was also the period
when the first manufacturing firms were established (mainly in consumer goods
and mining-related products). The literature has covered these industries and
the role of corporations both as receptors of investment and engines of eco-
nomic growth in detail3. This paper adds to the existing literature by being the
first systematic analysis of the universe of corporations chartered in Chile during
this period and the first to analyse their contractual provisions in detail.
3 Several studies discuss the role of corporations in different sectors of economic activity. Veliz
(1960) analyzes the creation and evolution of stock prices of maritime companies. Kirsh (1977)
shows data on the ownership composition of manufacturing companies. Bravo (2000) presents
detailed information about mining companies during the Caracoles boom, including shareholder
lists and evidence regarding stock transactions. Oppenheimer (1982) describes how railroad com-
panies raised capital. Pregger-Roman (1978) studies the interlocks on the boards of directors of
mining and financial firms. Cavieres (1984) studies the partnerships and corporations created in
Valparaı´so from 1820 to 1880 and Jofre (1964) presents data regarding incorporations in Santiago.
Ortega (2005) shows data on incorporations and stock subscribers from 1850 to 1880.
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The paper is also related to a growing body of research concerning law and
finance during the 19th and early 20th century. Musacchio (2008) studies the
evolution of creditor and shareholder rights in Brazil during 1890-1940. His
main finding is that, at the end of the 19th century, Brazil had higher levels of
market capitalisation over GDP and a higher level of shareholder and investor
protection than today, which seems to support the Rajan and Zingales view-
point. Miwa and Ramseyer (2000), studying the case of the Japanese cotton
industry, find charter provisions that aligned the incentives of managers and
shareholders and reduced the voting power of large shareholders. They argue
that such provisions allowed these companies to attract a significant number
of outside investors. Campbell and Turner (2011) analyse the contractual
provisions of a sample of 716 British companies, finding frequent use of voting
scales and maximum vote provisions. This paper contributes to this literature
not only by providing additional evidence from Chile but by studying the
determinants of governance mechanisms at a firm level.
The paper is organised as follows: section 2 presents a simple theoretical
model of corporate charters that will be used to frame the later discussion.
Section 3 discusses the main features of corporate law in Chile during the
19th century, describes the required steps in order to charter a corporation in
that period and presents descriptive statistics for Chilean corporations as
well as a brief description of the evolution of the stock market. Section 4
analyzes the contractual provisions included in the charters and studies
the determinants of the level of investor protection observed in different
companies. The conclusion follows.
2. CORPORATE CHARTERS AND INVESTOR PROTECTION:
A THEORETICAL DISCUSSION
The law and finance literature argues for the existence of a positive
relation between the investor protection provided by law and the level of
financial market development. However, in Code Law the level of investor
protection is a variable that can be contractually arranged by the organisers
of the firm and outside investors; therefore private contracts can be used as
substitutes for protection provided by the law. So, why do not all firms adopt
a high investor rights regime? Would the lack of legally mandated protection
mean that no firm would offer additional rights to their investors?
This question has been the focus of recent theoretical research (see
Lamoreaux and Rosenthal 2005; Bergman and Nocolaiesvky 2006). The starting
assumption is that there is some type of agency problem (manager-shareholders,
controlling shareholder-minority investors and so on) that cannot be optimally
solved due to some form of contractual incompleteness. One of the most studied
agency problems is the case when the party in control (manager or majority
investor) can extract some private benefit from controlling the firm. The usual
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assumption is that extraction is inefficient because it reduces the total value of
the firm (i.e. 1 dollar diverted from the firm by the agent in control generates less
than a dollar for the agent).
Assume an environment where there are no regulations regarding
investor protection and where agents can freely contract on this variable, as
was the case in Chile during the 19th century. In this context, increasing
investor rights can have a positive effect on firm value by reducing the
level of extraction of private rents by insiders and therefore attracting
outside investors. However, it can also impose efficiency costs on the firm
if offering a higher level of protection to outside investors leads to slower
decision making4.
A high level of investor rights, that is, more power for the shareholders’
assembly, increases the cost of investor expropriation for the insiders, but at
the same time it implies that potentially profitable investment projects are
not realised. These «lost opportunities» can be modelled as a «delay-time»
cost: If the approval of the assembly is required to make an important
investment decision, the minority investors can block expropriatory projects,
but, since setting up an assembly meeting takes time, by the time a decision
is made the investment opportunity can be lost. Delay-time cost is more
likely to be an important issue in an environment where personal transpor-
tation or communications are costly, and where corporate charters typically
require formalities like newspaper publications, minimum waiting times
and minimum attendance quorums in order to call a shareholder meeting.
Both elements were present in Chile during the period under study.
In this set-up, it can easily be shown that a charter with higher investor
rights will be preferred when the cost of the foregone opportunities is lower
than the cost of tunnelling.
The analysis can be extended by adding shareholder monitoring to the
basic model and exploring the substitutability between the assembly veto
powers and direct shareholder monitoring. Assume that when monitoring
the outside investor can identify when the entrepreneur takes an expro-
priatory action and can take him to court. If the cost of monitoring is low
enough, and there are no significant collective action problems, both insiders
and outside investors might be better off by adopting a regime with lower
investors’ rights.
Therefore, in equilibrium, in absence of detailed regulations regarding
investor rights, if organisers are free to define governance rules and, in
particular, the rights assigned to minority investors, heterogeneity in corpo-
rate arrangements should be observed. As I show in the following section,
Chilean corporate law during the 19th century gave corporations a large
degree of flexibility in internal governance matters. According to the theory,
4 The objective of the model is to analyse the optimal charter decision in an unregulated
environment. It does not compare this case with the case where investor rights are provided by law.
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charters should offer a higher degree of investor protection in more stable and
mature industries (i.e. when the emergence of new unexpected business
opportunities is less likely, and therefore the cost of missing opportunities is
low), when the expected return of the investment is low (otherwise the partici-
pation constraint will not be satisfied), when the probability of tunnelling or
expropriation by insiders is higher and when ex-post monitoring by investors is
too costly or when punishments are not enforceable. In section 4, I attempt to
examine these predictions using 19th century Chilean data.
3. CORPORATE LAW AND CORPORATIONS IN 19TH CENTURY CHILE
3.1. Corporate Law
Chile’s first corporate law was approved by Congress in 18545. The law was
strongly influenced by the legislation of continental Europe and was drafted in
response to demands for an adequate legislation by the Chilean business commu-
nity (Brahm 1997) and to solve the situation of share companies organised
during the 1850s whose legal status was unclear under the Chilean legislation6.
The corporate law of 1854 was short and straightforward. It defined a
corporation as a legal person formed by a common fund divided into shares.
The shareholders had limited liability. As was the case in the rest of Latin
America at the time, most of the regulations present in modern corporate
law were left to be decided by the charters of each firm. Nothing was said
regarding the composition of the board of directors, the requirements for
being a director and whether directors were paid by the firm or not. There
was no mention of voting rules, whether shareholders had the right to
be represented by someone else at a shareholders’ meeting, or if they had the
right to call an extraordinary meeting. The only reference to governance
matters was that no director could be appointed for life; rather directors
should serve for specific terms that could be renewed by the shareholders.
According to the law, corporate charters must include:
> Name, occupation and address of the founding members.
> Location of the headquarters of the company.
> The objective of the company.
> Capital and number of shares, and the way and time at which the
shareholders must complete their contributions.
> Lifespan of the company.
5 Ley de Sociedades Ano´nimas, November 8, 1854.
6 Until 1854 Chilean business organisation was still regulated by the Bilbao Ordinances, a Spanish
legal body from the colonial period. In terms of organisational choices, the Bilbao Ordinances only
recognised the simple partnership (contrato de sociedad simple) and the limited partnerships (contrato de
sociedad en comandita).
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> Functions of the administrators and of the general assembly of
shareholders.
> The capital deficit that causes the liquidation of the company and the
procedure of dissolution.
Any breach of the charters could lead to the dissolution of the corpora-
tion, and managers and shareholders responsible for a contract violation
could be sued for the damage caused.
All corporations had to publish a balance sheet every 6 months. Share-
holders could only have access to the books of the company at the times and
in the ways prescribed by the charters of the firm.
A corporation could be created only with a special licence from the
executive branch of the government; this authorisation was also necessary
in the case of modification of the charter or dissolution of the company.
This was a common requirement in continental Europe at the time the law
was passed and was also adopted in Latin America.
The authorisation process had two parts: first, the organisers had
to submit the proposal of the charter of the corporation and a list of the
founding shareholders and their contributions (at least one-third of the
shares must have been previously subscribed by this time). The proposal was
then evaluated by the Judiciary Supreme Court, whose role was to make
sure that the charter was written according to law. Once the proposal was
approved the entrepreneurs were given the authorisation to organise the
firm. Once this process was completed, a second authorisation allowed the
company to start its operations7.
It is interesting to note that the law established that among the causes
for rejection was the case where the charter did not offer shareholders
«guarantees of a good administration, mechanisms to monitor the behavior
of managers and rights to know the use of corporate funds». Given the
fact that government officials could reject corporate charters, it raises the
possibility that the authorisation process was used to filter out corporations
that did not offer enough rights to their shareholders. I argue that this was
not the case in Chile.
The reports of the Ministry of Finance and the Chilean Supreme Court
reveal that government officials rarely raised objections regarding the govern-
ance provisions included in the charters, and the analysis of the charters shows
that there were cases in different industries when a corporation was approved
without including any rights for minority shareholders. Most of the objections
raised by the judiciary are related to formal aspects and internal consistency of
the charters8, and on the rare occasions where the Supreme Court questioned
7 For the companies created in Santiago and Valparaı´so the average time span between the
constitution of the company and first authorisation was 76 days (123 days for the rest of the
country).
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the internal governance of the firm, their recommendations were not neces-
sarily followed by the executive officials. A telling example is the case of
the «Gran Compan˜ı´a Arturo Prat», a nitrate company established in 1882
with a fully paid capital of one million pesos represented by its mining
properties. According to the report of the Supreme Court the valuation of these
properties was far above the real market price. The report suggested denying
the government authorisation arguing that it should be the government’s
responsibility to protect investors from potential fraudulent companies. The
official answer of the Ministry of Finance was the following: «It is not the
responsibility of the government to qualify the «fair price» of the mines that
are exploited by corporations, but only to judge that their charters comply with
the law». The charter of the company was approved without modifications9.
Moreover, it is important to notice that the law allowed a close substitute
of the corporation: the limited partnership with tradable shares («Sociedad
en Comandita por acciones» (LPTS)). An LPTS was formed between one or
more general partners, who managed the firm and were fully liable for its
obligations, and one or more limited partners with limited liability and no
managing rights. The LPTS allowed entrepreneurs to raise capital from
outside investors who had both the benefits of limited liability and liquidity,
thereby providing a close substitute to the investment in corporate stock10.
The LPTS was used as a substitute for corporations in continental Europe
before general incorporation was available. In Chile, this organisational form
was included in the 1865 Commercial Code (with a statute that closely
followed the French law of 1846). However, it was rarely used by Chilean
entrepreneurs (Cruchaga 1929), suggesting that the obstacles to obtaining a
corporate licence were not that high and that entrepreneurs organising a
corporation in Chile during the 19th century had plenty of freedom to choose
the governance agreements best suited to their objectives.
The law also allowed the government to designate a special public auditor
(comisario), to monitor corporate managers and their compliance with the
law and charters of the company.
Did these government agents provide indirect protection to investors? The
evidence provided by the «Directions for public auditors» (1887) suggests that
this was not the case11. The description of the functions of these agents seems
to be only related with banking activities: «check the monthly financial
statement of banks, certify their account balances, and verify that the firm
complied with the procedures established in the law». For non-financial
8 For example, some charters were initially rejected because they did not include the legal
address of the company (Sociedad Minera el Morado, 1899), the name of the initial subscribers, or
failed to specify the lifespan of the company (Minera de Batuco, 1884).
9 Boletı´n de las Leyes, Vol. LI, pp. 935–974 (1882).
10 See Lamoreaux and Rosenthal (2005) for a detailed discussion of the advantages and
disadvantages of the different organisational forms available in civil law countries.
11 Decree of the Ministry of Finance, 21/4/1887.
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companies the role of the public auditors was restricted to tax-collection-
related activities.
The law remained virtually unmodified throughout the 19th century.
More detailed regulations of corporate matters were enacted during the
19th century in Europe and also in some Latin American countries such as
Argentina, Mexico and Venezuela (Pistor et al. 2002). Although legal scholars
and editorialists of the time proposed modifications in Chile12, there were no
significant changes of the governance rules until 191813.
3.2. Corporations Chartered in Chile 1854-1902
Five hundred and seventy-three corporations were created in Chile from
1854 to 190214. Table 1 presents the corporations created during this period
and the capital subscribed.
The introduction of corporate organisational form in the Chilean business
community was slow and corporations accounted for ,5 per cent of the total
firms created in Valparaı´so between 1854 and 1870 (Cavieres 1984). The
creation of corporations really took off after 1870. Two factors account for this
change: (1) the growth of the banking system after the banking law of 1860,
which gave investors easier access to credit; and (2) the discovery of silver
deposits in Caracoles, Bolivia, in 1870. Seventy-five companies were estab-
lished between 1871 and 1873 to exploit these deposits and also to exploit
nitrate in Tarapaca´, Peru15. During these years there was also increased
activity in other sectors (including finance and manufacturing) and in the
participation of investors: the average number of initial subscribers rose from
26.3 before 1871 to 34.7 during 1871-1873. Investing in stocks, until then a
concern for a very small minority, became a much more common activity:
teachers, public employees and artisans appear in the lists of subscribing
shareholders. After 1871, stock price quotations appeared regularly in the
main newspapers of Santiago and Valparaı´so16.
The decline in terms of trade led to a recession during the second half of
the 1870s, which had an immediate impact on the number of incorporations.
Only thirteen new corporations were chartered from 1875 to 1880 and most
of the silver companies in Caracoles were liquidated. In 1879, a dispute over
12 Barrios (1899), Cofre Silva (1906), Cruchaga (1886), see also «Revista Econo´mica» (1882).
13 Minor reforms were enacted in 1878 and 1887.
14 By way of comparison, from 1807 to 1867 (the year that general incorporation was intro-
duced in France), the French government approved fewer than 700 charters (Freedeman 1979).
15 It is worth noting that nearly all the mining companies formed in this period were operating
outside Chile.
16 Santiago (the capital) and Valparaı´so (the main port) were the main commercial centres at
the time. See Couyoumdjian et al. (1992) for a history of the development of the Santiago stock
market.
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the control of the mining resources in the Atacama Desert led to a war
between Chile and a coalition between Peru and Bolivia (War of the Pacific).
At the end of the war (1882), Chile took control of the mining-rich
territories of Tarapaca´ and Antofagasta. The wealth generated from the
nitrate mines in the newly-annexed territories spurred economic growth
and increased both the interest of investors and the number of companies
created17. As had been the case during the silver boom in Caracoles during
the previous decade, discoveries of new minerals and fluctuations in inter-
national prices led to cyclical stock market booms during the 1880s.
In the last decade of the 19th century, there was an increase in the number
of banks and insurance companies. Also, the manufacturing industry that
had started to develop before the war in small establishments grew in size,
leading to the creation of larger companies that adopted the corporate
organisational form in industries such as beer, tobacco and sugar refining.
During most of the period, stock trade was conducted by brokers in their
own offices or in informal saloon meetings twice a week. The first attempts to
create a formal stock market were made during the 1872-1873 boom, but
none of them lasted beyond 1875. In 1892, the Santiago stock exchange
was created with forty registered brokers, followed by the Valparaı´so stock
exchange in 1895. The majority of the corporations were chartered and based
TABLE 1
CORPORATIONS CHARTERED 1854-1902
Companies Capital (£) Capital/GDP (%)
1854-1860 10 1,692,404 0.42
1861-1865 13 2,128,304 0.72
1866-1870 24 6,020,992 2.09
1871-1875 129 15,614,971 4.40
1876-1880 13 2,499,799 0.60
1881-1885 76 3,002,333 0.99
1886-1890 108 6,300,922 2.76
1893-1895 85 6,767,334 5.15
1896-1900 35 2,205,024 1.67
1901-1902 80 3,735,000 1.95
Total 573 49,917,083
Source: Own elaboration, based on Boletı´n de las leyes y decretos del Gobierno and Braun et al. (2000).
17 However, most of the nitrate companies were controlled by British investors.
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in Santiago and Valparaı´so even though mining activities were located either
in the northern provinces (copper, silver and nitrate) or in the south (coal).
The same is true for railroads (most of them were associated with mining
activities) and some of the public utility companies.
Table 2 shows the number of corporations and total capital subscribed
by economic activity. I classify economic activities in six main sectors:
Mining, Manufacturing, Financial Services, Maritime, Utilities, Railroads
and Others (Retail, Construction Companies, Agriculture and Forestry,
Racetracks and Hotels). From the table it is apparent that mining (silver,
copper, gold and nitrate) and finance (banks and insurance companies) were
the most important sectors both in terms of capital subscribed and in
number of firms.
Table 3 shows the market size in December 1902. Market size with
respect to GDP was around 15 per cent. This figure is comparable with other
Latin American countries and lower than European countries at the same
time. However, in terms of the number of firms per million people, Chile
compares favourably to other countries at the same time.
To summarise, the evidence introduced in this section shows that the lack
of formal legal protection was not an obstacle to the use of the corporate
form by Chilean entrepreneurs or the development of a stock market in Chile
during the 19th century, suggesting that legal protection is not a necessary
condition for the development of financial markets. In the next section,
I attempt to answer the following questions: Do charters provide outside
investors with rights and guarantees that were absent in the law? Do the
contractual provisions included in the charters reflect systematic differences
between firms as predicted by the agency model?
TABLE 2
CORPORATIONS PER ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
Companies Subscribed capital (£)
Mining 224 14,069,479
Manufacturing 68 3,263,316
Finance 93 25,114,037
Maritime 40 2,581,359
Utilities 35 873,561
Transportation 44 2,300,089
Others 69 1,715,242
Total 573 49,917,083
Source: Own elaboration, based on Boletı´n de las leyes y decretos del Gobierno.
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4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF CORPORATE CHARTERS
The corporate charter (estatuto) is the contract that specifies the internal
governance mechanisms of a firm and the rights and duties of the different
stakeholders. As previously explained, Chilean corporate law gave the organi-
sers of a corporation freedom to choose any governance regime and minority
investor rights.
Since corporations required a government authorisation, each charter
was approved by a special decree of the Ministry of Finance that was pub-
lished in the «Bulletin of Laws and Decrees of the Government»18. Using
government decrees, I collected the charters of Chilean corporations created
from 1854 to 1902. The database includes 549 charters representing 95.8 per
cent of the corporations created during the period. The law also established
that government approval was necessary for any charter modification or
liquidation of a company. I collected the details of 185 charter reforms and
124 liquidations.
In 471 cases (83 per cent) the company charter published in the Bulletin
of Laws and Decrees also included names of the initial investors and the
number of shares subscribed by each of them.
The analysis is conducted as follows: I start with a description of the
ownership structure, followed by an analysis of the articles regarding voting
TABLE 3
PAID CAPITAL PER ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 1902
1902
Companies Paid capital (£)
Mining 47 4,544,224
Manufacturing 27 1,629,023
Finance 55 3,498,903
Maritime 12 598,641
Utilities 24 466,234
Transportation 21 559,905
Other 20 181,143
Total 206 11,478,072
Capital/GDP 15.6%
Source: Own elaboration, based on Boletı´n de las leyes y decretos del Gobierno and Anuario Wessel.
18 From 1877 onwards the charters were also published in the daily official gazette.
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rights and shareholders meetings. Then, I describe the governance rules and
the distribution of power among the board of directors, the shareholders’
assembly, and managerial strata of the company. Finally, I discuss the evi-
dence regarding charter modifications.
4.1. Ownership Structure
Since the seminal study of Berle and Means (1932), ownership concentra-
tion in corporations has been the subject of constant attention of academicians
and policy makers. Available evidence shows that high levels of ownership
concentration are frequent outside the United Kingdom and the United States,
and Chile is no exception (see Morck et al. 2005).
Table 4 presents statistics regarding ownership concentration. The data
indicate that, at the time of its incorporation, the average number of
shareholders of a firm was forty-seven. On average, the five largest share-
holders (C5) held 48.2 per cent of the stock. The ownership concentration
level is lower than today’s Chile, where C5 is nearly 80 per cent. These results
are similar to other country level studies for the same period19.
The average number of shareholders needed to hold a majority was seven20.
Large shareholders were also present in companies with a significant number
TABLE 4
OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE PER ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
Shareholders
(mean)
Stake held
by largest
shareholder (%)
Minimum
number for
majority control
Use of bene-
ficial shares
(% of firms)
Mining 32.5 26.7 4.4 59
Manufacturing 39.7 26.8 5.7 45
Finance 88.5 9.6 14.5 2
Maritime 42.5 20.4 6.3 16
Utilities 42.3 23.5 6.0 32
Transportation 47.8 20.7 8.1 38
Others 60.0 14.6 13.8 18
Total 47.1 22.1 7.1 37.5
Source: Own elaboration, based on Boletı´n de las leyes y decretos del Gobierno.
19 See Franks et al. (2006) for the case of Germany and Franks et al. (2007) for the case of Japan.
20 This figure does not consider the effects of voting rules, given that voting scales and max-
imum voting limits were common during the period, the actual number required is higher.
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of investors, showing that minority investors were willing to participate in
companies even in the presence of block concentration.
Both in terms of number of shareholders and the largest stake, ownership
concentration was higher in the mining and manufacturing sectors. A common
practice was to divide the shares between «contributive» shares (i.e. shares that
were paid in cash) and «beneficial» shares (shares paid in services or kind).
Two hundred and six companies (37.5 per cent)21 used this mechanism, most
frequently in mining (59 per cent), usually as compensation for the value of
mining properties; and in manufacturing (44.6 per cent), as payment for
exclusive privileges or patents. Only eleven companies (5.3 per cent) that
divided their capital between beneficial and contributive shares also assigned
different voting rights to each type of share. Whenever different rights were
used, beneficial shares had fewer voting rights than contributive ones. Since
beneficial shares were usually allocated to the organisers of the company, this
shows that insiders did not allocate themselves any special voting rights (even
though the law allowed them to do so), on the contrary, in some cases they
were willing to restrict their voting power in order to attract outside investors.
4.2. Shareholders’ Meetings and Voting Rights
Chilean law established that «Shareholders’ assembly will meet regularly to
analyze the situation of the company, modify the charter and decide in any
matter of common interest to the shareholders». Most charters established two
ordinary shareholders’ meetings per year on preset dates. The board of directors
was required to publish both the place and time of the meeting in the press.
Regarding extraordinary meetings, the law gave the board the right to call
a meeting «whenever it is in the interest of the company» but made no
reference to the rights of shareholders to do so without consent of the board.
Nearly all (99.3 per cent) charters included articles regarding extraordinary
meetings and 96.9 per cent of them allowed shareholders to call a meeting.
Each company set up a requirement based on a certain number of share-
holders (221 companies, 40.3 per cent) or a certain percentage of shares (477
companies, 86.9 per cent). 45.2 per cent of the companies with a percentage
of shares-based requirement allowed the shareholders to call an extra-
ordinary meeting with 10 per cent or less of the shares.
The literature has identified voting rights as an important element in the
corporate governance of a firm. Contemporary studies have shown that the
use of different voting rights per share is related to minority oppression. In
the original study of La Porta et al., the use of a law mandated one share-one
vote (1s1v) rule is identified as one of the factors correlated with financial
development.
21 All percentages are calculated using the number of charters available (549) instead of the
number of corporations.
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In Chilean corporations, the use of different voting rights per share
was uncommon (and, contrary to contemporary practice, tended to favour
minority investors). Also relatively uncommon was the use of a pure 1s1v
voting system. Only 21.1 per cent of companies had such a voting system.
While current financial literature identifies 1s1v as a pro-investor voting
regime, it is not the case of Chile during the 19th century. Most Chilean
corporations had some type of restriction on the maximum amount of votes
per shareholder. Three hundred and eighty-seven companies (70.5 per cent)
had a ceiling on the maximum amount of votes that a shareholder could cast
(including own and proxy shares). The average cap was 13.8 per cent. In 330
of these firms, the maximum vote was binding; therefore, the majority of
firms had contractual provisions that were effectively curtailing the voting
power of the largest shareholder.
Another voting scheme used during the 19th century was the graduated
voting scale. A voting scale is a system in which the ratio of vote to shares
decreases with the number of shares, and is usually complemented with
some kind of maximum vote provision (Dunlavy 2004). Fifty companies
(9.1 per cent) had a graduated voting scale; this mechanism was more fre-
quent before 1875.
Both maximum vote provisions and graduated voting scales dilute the
power of the majority shareholders and consequently increase the power of
minority investors. Table 5 summarises voting rules per economic activity.
To study the differences in voting rules across firms I use a linear regres-
sion model. The dependent variable is the index of voting rights (Hilt 2008).
TABLE 5
VOTING RULES PER ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
1s1v
(% of firms)
Voting
scale
(% of firms)
Maximum vote
provision
(% of firms)
Average
maximum
vote (%)
Index of
voting rights
(V) (%)
Mining 24.3 4.5 67.6 14.6 42
Manufacturing 26.2 4.6 69.2 15.5 41
Finance 10.6 10.6 76.5 7.7 29
Maritime 10.5 23.7 84.2 16.8 29
Utilities 11.8 17.6 73.5 15.0 37
Transportation 15.0 27.5 80.0 14.6 29
Others 33.8 3.1 58.5 15.3 50
Total 21.1 9.1 70.5 13.8 42
Source: Own elaboration, based on Boletı´n de las leyes y decretos del Gobierno.
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This index captures both the effect of maximum vote provisions and voting
scales in the same measure. The index is defined as follows:
Vi ¼
1
N
XN
n¼1
viðnÞ
n
where N is the total numbers of shares and v(n) is number of votes that a
shareholder owning (or representing) n shares is entitled to. The index goes
from 0 to 1, where values closer to zero mean that the voting power of large
shareholders is more curtailed by the restrictions.
Table 6 presents the results of different specifications of a regression
model with the index of voting rights as the dependent variable. The inde-
pendent variables include capital, dummies for economic activity, use of
beneficial shares, time trend and a dummy variable (location) to indicate
cases when the productive activities were located far from the company
investors (e.g. a water company chartered in Santiago to provide services
in another town). This variable can be understood as a proxy for higher
monitoring costs.
The coefficient for beneficial shares is negative and significant in all cases.
As beneficial shares were usually distributed among the organisers of the firm,
a negative coefficient means that organisers were more willing to restrict their
voting power when their contributions to the firm were made in kind. The
dummy for geographical separation between investors and the operations of
the firm is negative and significant, meaning that voting rules that favoured
minority investors were more frequently used in cases where monitoring
was more costly. The economic activity dummies are negative in most cases
(the base category is «others»). Capital is only significant in the first specifi-
cation, which does not include the dummies for economic activity.
The limitations to the voting rights of the majority decreased for incorpora-
tions after 1880. This result is in line with the increased use of 1s1v in Europe
and the United States at the same time. However, 67 per cent of the companies
chartered after 1880 had restrictions to the voting power of the majority.
4.3. Governance: Assembly, Board of Directors and Managers’
Attributions
Most firm charters identified three main groups of stakeholders with
decision rights within the firm: the shareholders’ assembly, the board of
directors and managers. Charters also included provisions that regulated the
administration of the business22. The degree of detail of these provisions and
22 Some of them were industry related: bank charters, for example, included provisions
regarding interest rates; insurance companies’ charters regulate the type and maximum value of
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TABLE 6
REGRESSION RESULTS: DEPENDENT VARIABLE VOTING RIGHTS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Paid capital 20.0191* 20.00671 0.00212 20.00188
(0.0114) (0.0129) (0.0130) (0.0132)
Beneficial shares 20.0524 20.0733* 20.0766* 20.0656
(0.0365) (0.0400) (0.0395) (0.0399)
Year.1880 0.119*** 0.123*** 0.0765*
(0.0375) (0.0379) (0.0394)
Location 20.180*** 20.153***
(0.0476) (0.0488)
Mining 20.109* 20.0162 20.00657
(0.0652) (0.0690) (0.0705)
Manufacturing 20.147* 20.143* 20.142*
(0.0758) (0.0749) (0.0756)
Finance 20.219*** 20.254*** 20.244***
(0.0808) (0.0802) (0.0813)
Maritime 20.277*** 20.283*** 20.272***
(0.0883) (0.0872) (0.0887)
Transportation 20.263*** 20.250*** 20.243***
(0.0846) (0.0835) (0.0865)
Utilities 20.197** 20.142 20.146
(0.0906) (0.0906) (0.0916)
Time dummies No No No Yes
Observations 513 513 513 513
R2 0.027 0.060 0.086 0.106
*Significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%.
Source: Own elaboration, based on Boletı´n de las leyes y decretos del Gobierno.
(F’note continued)
insurance policies; railroads and maritime companies’ charters included freight rates. Also common
was the inclusion of non-pecuniary benefits to shareholders, such as special rates or prices on
services offered by the firm (in utilities, railroads and maritime companies) or priority to access
certain benefits.
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of the description of the attributions of the board of directors and the
shareholders’ assembly varied greatly across firms.
Board members were chosen at the shareholders’ assembly for a period
between one and three years. In 526 companies (96 per cent), the charter
established that in order to be a member of the board it was necessary to
be a shareholder, and in 65 per cent of the companies it required a minimum
amount of shares. Even though this requirement was usually low (,1 per
cent of the stock on average), those who sat on the board were usually
majority shareholders. Of the 330 companies for which information
regarding the composition of the first board of directors is available, board
members accounted for 32 per cent of the stock.
The possibility of recalling directors was included in 198 companies
(38.6 per cent). The average percentage of votes required to recall one or
more director was 59 per cent. This contractual clause was more frequently
used in corporations chartered after 1881 (47 per cent from 1881 to 1902,
15 per cent before (t-test5 8.46) and in financial services (54 per cent).
Charters also enumerated the main functions of the board. The degree
of detail of the descriptions of functions varied across companies. One
important aspect of corporate governance revealed by this analysis of
the functions of boards is that Chilean corporations conceived the board
not solely as a supervisor of management but also as an agent with a strong
role in conducting the business of the firm. In 81.1 per cent of firms,
the charter defined as a function of the board either «to manage the firm»
or to «conclude contracts» or to «decide in all matters related to business».
When not restricted by the shareholders’ assembly, it was the board
of directors, and not the manager, who decided on all purchases, sales
or mortgages.
The board was in charge of appointing and removing the manager
(in only one case was the manager appointed by the shareholders’ assembly).
Most charters defined the manager as a paid employee in charge of the daily
operations of the firm and of taking charge of the accounting books23, and
clearly subordinated the manager to the authority of the board. In 60.4 per
cent of the charters the first obligation of the manager was to «execute
all board agreements». No company gave the manager the power to sell or
mortgage assets and, in the majority of cases (91.6 per cent), managers were
also restricted by the board in hiring and firing employees.
Since managers had limited power regarding strategic decisions and in
the majority of cases important decisions required the authorisation of the
board, the following analysis focuses on the balance of power between
the board of directors and the shareholders’ assembly. For the Chilean
case, given that founders and majority shareholders were usually sitting on
23 The payment mechanism is usually left open. In some cases the charter explicitly authorised
the board to use profit-based contracts.
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the board, the assembly-board relation is also closer to the theoretical
entrepreneur-investor relation analysed in the model introduced in section 2.
Given that the degree of detail of the charters varies greatly, in order to
analyse the balance of power between the shareholders’ assembly and the
board of directors, I used as the variable of analysis the right to decide to
sell assets or to mortgage assets above a given size or considered funda-
mental for the operation of the firm, which is assigned in 89 per cent of the
corporate charters.
The model suggests that this right should be allocated to the shareholders’
assembly when the direct monitoring costs are high, when delay costs are
low and when extraction costs are high.
In corporate governance, binary choice models are used to study the
determinants of use of anti-takeover and other contractual rules (Bhagat and
Jefferis 2002). In order to make good the definition I use the following criteria:
Shareholders had the right to mortgage a specific asset if the board faced
restrictions on selling or mortgaging any asset, on selling or mortgaging some
specific assets or restrictions on selling or mortgaging assets that accounted for
more than 10 per cent of total capital. In 264 charters (54.2 per cent), this right
was allocated to the board of directors; in 223 cases (45.8 per cent), the charter
established that the assembly had to approve any significant transaction. The
assembly was given this power most frequently in mining (63 per cent). On the
contrary, in 85.1 per cent of the financial companies, the board of directors had
unrestricted power to make these decisions.
Table 7 presents the results of a probit regression using the right to sell
or mortgage assets as the dependent variable with a value 1 for the cases
where the assembly had veto powers regarding sale or mortgage of a critical
asset. The explanatory variables are: paid capital, location dummy, use of
beneficial shares, dummies for time period, economic activity and place of
incorporation.
For ease of exposition, I present the marginal effects of the variables
on the probability of having a pro-minority voting regime instead of the
direct probit coefficients. Marginal effects are evaluated at the mean of the
independents variables. In the case of dichotomic variables the table reports
the effect of a change from 0 to 1.
Paid capital is non-significant in the first specification, but positive (and
statistically significant) in the second and third specifications when the
dummies for economic activities are added. The location dummy is signi-
ficant in all specifications; the value of the coefficient is between 0.2 and
0.3, meaning that companies where investors were located far from the
operations of the company were between 20 per cent and 30 per cent more
probable to give more attributions to the shareholders assembly. Both results
are consistent with the prediction of the agency model. The dummies for
Santiago and Valparaı´so are not significant. The dummy for the mining
sector is positive and significant when the location dummy is not included
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TABLE 7
PROBIT REGRESSION RESULTS: DEPENDENT VARIABLE VOTING RIGHTS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Paid capital 20.009 0.032 0.031 0.033
(0.59) (1.80)* (1.61) (1.70)*
Beneficial shares 20.137 20.079 20.089
(2.64)*** (1.43) (1.59)
Year .1880 0.115 0.047 0.079
(2.16)** (0.9) (1.4)
Location 0.315 0.223 0.194
(6.19)*** (2.89)*** (2.43)**
Santiago 20.095 20.092
(1.19) (1.14)
Valparaı´so 20.117 20.111
(1.52) (1.42)
Mining 0.204 0.072 0.079
(2.48)** (0.75) (0.79)
Manufacturing 0.128 0.139 0.136
(1.27) (1.36) (1.31)
Finance 20.369 20.351 20.356
(3.78)*** (3.45)*** (3.47)***
Maritime 20.284 20.271 20.272
(2.49)** (2.23)** (2.22)**
Transportation 0.037 0.003 0.005
(0.32) (0.03) (0.04)
Utilities 0.067 0.056 0.043
(0.58) (0.47) (0.35)
Time dummies No No No Yes
Observations 488 488 488 488
Pseudo R2 0.06 0.12 0.14 0.15
Likelihood Ratio Test x2 43.48 81.2 93.43 98.39
*Significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%.
Source: Own elaboration, based on Boletı´n de las leyes y decretos del Gobierno.
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but its coefficient is close to 0 and non-significant when controlling by the
location dummy. On the contrary, the dummy for the financial sector is
negative in all specifications; this result is probably due to the fact that the
right to veto sale or mortgage physical assets is less valuable in financial
companies compared with the rest of the economic activities.
The dummy for incorporations after 1880 is positive, implying that the
use of veto powers increased over time suggesting more concerns of the
investors after the boom and crash of 1873. Notice that this is the exact
opposite of the evolution of the pro-minority voting rules, suggesting that
maximum vote restrictions and veto rights for the shareholders’ assembly
were used as substitutes regarding its role as investor protection tools. This is
further explored in the following section.
4.4. Factor Analysis
Factor analysis is a statistical method that makes it possible to detect
patterns in a set of interval-level variables, all of which are treated as
dependent. In the context of this investigation, the variables are the different
contractual clauses used in corporate charters.
The methodology closely follows Danielson and Karpoff (1998). I analyse
ten governance provisions and assign the value of 1 whenever this provision
is defined in the corporate charter in a way that favours the minority
investors and 0 if it is not. Provisions include, among others, voting rights,
attributions of the assembly and board of directors, election of the board of
directors, requirements to be a board member and dispute resolution
mechanisms.
Table 8 presents a detailed definition of the ten provisions included in
the analysis. Provisions defined in a sufficiently large number of charters
were chosen, which makes it possible to compute the underlying factors (the
results below are based on 367 companies for which is possible to compute
all ten variables).
For each of the contractual provisions I run auxiliary regressions using
the provision as the dependent variable and dummies for economic activities
and five-year period dummies as explanatory variables. I compute the factor
analysis using the residuals of these regressions. This method allows me to
exclude the long time span of the data and differences between economic
activities as sources of variation. The three factors with eigenvalues .1 are
retained. Results are presented after a varimax rotation and are summarised
in Table 9.
The table shows that several provisions are observed together. The first
factor is loaded with governance provisions related to ex-post control (calling
extraordinary meetings, recalling directors) and the process of election of
directors. The second factor is loaded with ex-ante mechanisms, such as
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provisions regarding the shareholders’ assembly having the explicit faculty to
block some of the board’s decisions (sale or mortgage of assets, charter
reforms, dissolution of the company), and the third factor is related to auditing
functions. In many provisions factors 1 and 2 are negatively related, suggesting
that firms used ex-ante and ex-post systems of control as substitutes. This
result is consistent with the agency model presented in section 2: the cost of
providing ex-post or ex-ante protection differs for each firm, and therefore,
each firm chooses the most cost-efficient mechanism to provide protection for
their investors.
4.5. Charter Reforms
Any charter reform required the approval of the shareholders’ assembly.
Four hundred and thirty-nine charters (80 per cent) included specific rules
and voting requirements regarding charter reform. The average percentage
TABLE 8
CORPORATE PROVISIONS INCLUDED IN FACTOR ANALYSIS
Variable Definition
Extraordinary
meeting
1 if it is possible to call an extraordinary meeting with ,15% of
the total shares and fewer than ten shareholders
Maximum vote 1 if there is a maximum corresponding to 15% or less of the total
shares
Free representa-
tion
1 if a shareholder can be represented by some other person at a
shareholder meeting by letter addressed to the president of the
meeting, without notarised power of attorney
No related per-
sons
1 if two related persons or partners cannot serve at the same time
in the board of directors
Recall 1 if the charter explicitly includes a mechanism to recall one or
more members of the board of directors.
Mortgage 1 if decisions regarding the sale or mortgage of assets that
represent more than 10% of the total assets or require assembly
approval
Reform 1 if charter reforms require a supra-majority quorum of the
assembly
Dissolution 1 if the shareholders’ assembly takes charge of the company in
case of dissolution
Audit committee 1 if the charter explicitly includes an audit committee
Arbitrage 1 if the charter explicitly includes arbitrage mechanisms
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of approval required for charter reform was 60.6 per cent. After a charter
reform was approved by the shareholders’ assembly, it had to be submitted to
the government for approval. Charter reforms were also published in the
official bulletins. In 155 cases (from a total of 185), the government decree
included details of the contents of the reform: the most common reform
submitted for government approval was an increase of capital (45.2 per
cent). Another frequent modification was on the definition of the scope of
the firm’s activities, for example, new policies for insurance companies,
extension to mining activities by foundries or vice-versa or changes in the
location of the company (22.7 per cent). Table 10 details the type of reforms
and their frequency.
Governance rules were also subject to modifications. There were changes in
voting rights (20 per cent), attributions of the board of directors, the number of
members of the board and their term of office (19.4 per cent) and rules to call
an extraordinary meeting (4.5 per cent). There is no clear direction to these
changes: some companies modified their charters to impose more restrictions
on maximum votes while others did so to introduce a 1s1v regime, some
companies increased the power of their board of directors while others took
attributions from them and gave them to the shareholders’ assembly.
For the objectives of this paper, two interesting cases to consider are the
reforms introduced by «Compan˜ı´a de Gatico» and «Compan˜ı´a Industrial».
The former was a copper company established in 1900 with six subscribing
shareholders, all of them belonging to the same family. The initial charter of
TABLE 9
FACTOR ANALYSIS RESULTS
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Uniqueness
Extraordinary meeting 0.64 20.32 0.01 0.49
Maximum vote 0.61 20.06 0.51 0.36
Free representation 0.82 0.02 20.25 0.27
No related persons 0.93 20.03 0.15 0.12
Recall 0.37 20.26 20.10 0.78
Mortgage 20.91 0.28 0.10 0.08
Reform 20.03 0.58 0.12 0.65
Dissolution 20.23 0.88 0.01 0.18
Arbitration 20.03 0.13 0.82 0.31
Audit committee 20.18 20.36 0.55 0.54
Source: Own elaboration.
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the company had no mention of shareholder rights, no rules to designate the
board and no clear distinction of the functions of the shareholders’ assembly,
the board of directors and management. Two years later, the company
decided to increase its capital by issuing new shares to the general public.
At the same time, the governance rules were modified, increasing the number
of directors from three to five to be reelected annually, giving shareholders
the right to call extraordinary meetings with 10 per cent of the shares and
establishing a voting ceiling24.
The case of «Compan˜ı´a Industrial», a chemical company established in
1901, is an example of how governance rules were relevant from a minority
investor perspective. In 1902 the majority shareholders (who controlled the
majority of the board) decided to reduce the number of directors (thereby
excluding representatives from minority investors), to elevate the percentage
of shares required to call an extraordinary meeting to 60 per cent (at the time
the directors of the company held more than 40 per cent themselves) and to
establish a five-year term for board members (no other company charter
approved from 1854 to 1902 had board terms longer than three years). A
group of minority shareholders opposed the reform in the assembly meeting
and later filed a complaint to the judiciary to block the reform. The com-
plaint was dismissed by the courts on the grounds that the reform was
approved by the number of votes required in the charter25.
Both examples show that governance rules were relevant to investors. In
the first case, the desire to obtain financing from outside investors made the
TABLE 10
CHARTER MODIFICATIONS
Type of reform Frequency (%)
Capital increase 45.2
Company activities 22.6
Changes in voting rights 20
Extension to the life-span of the corporation 11.6
Changes in board functions and number of directors 19.4
Rules to call an shareholder meeting 4.5
Changes in non-pecuniary shareholders’ benefits 1.3
Changes in nominal value of shares 12.9
Source: Own elaboration, based on Boletı´n de las leyes y decretos del Gobierno.
24 Diario Oficial, 7178, p. 876, 1902.
25 Diario Oficial, 3136, p. 7377, 1902.
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owning family modify the governance rules, including investor rights that
were absent in the original contract, while in the case of «Compan˜ı´a Indus-
trial» the minority investors who tried to block the reform of the company
charters clearly understood that under the new rules they could be easily be
subjects of expropriation by the firm’s insiders.
5.. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper presents an analysis of the charters of Chilean corporations
during the second half of the 19th century.
Even though Chile was far from the main economic centres of the time,
during this period the Chilean economy was integrated with the rest of the
world. The main economic activity was the export of natural resources.
Chilean and foreign entrepreneurs frequently used corporations as a vehicle
to raise capital to organise mining activities and also to develop the financial
system, build railroads, provide basic services to the growing Chilean cities
and finance the first steps of industrialisation.
The 19th century is also the period during which Chile, like the rest of Latin
America, developed its legal and economic institutions. In the particular case of
commercial law, the model followed in these countries was the civil law from
continental Europe. The influential «law and finance» literature argues that
countries with French legal origins have lower levels of investor and creditor
protection, and that this lack of protection is one of the main causes of the
financial underdevelopment in Latin America. This paper studies the case of
Chile to show that the lack of investor protection provided by the law was not
an impossible obstacle for Chilean entrepreneurs to raise funds and argues that
private contracts (corporate charters) were used as a substitute for the lack of
law-provided investor rights.
I collected the charters of 549 Chilean corporations and show that even
though the law was silent regarding the rights of investors, firms’ charters
usually included among their provisions several mechanisms of investor pro-
tection: charters gave investors the right to summon extraordinary meetings,
and often limited the influence of large shareholders by imposing limits on their
voting power. In addition, charters allowed investors to form auditing groups
as well as to be represented by someone else in meetings and to solve their
differences with the managers and board by arbitration. All of these investor
rights and check mechanisms were absent from corporate law at that time.
Chilean corporate charters also regulated the attributions of the board of
directors and the shareholders’ assembly, most of them defined the board
of directors as the agent in charge of the administration of the firm, with
the manager clearly in a subordinate position. At the same time, charters
frequently imposed restrictions on the functions of the board, giving the
shareholders’ assembly important veto powers in strategic decisions.
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The empirical analysis shows that the use of different provisions is
consistent with the predictions of a simple principal-agent model. I find
that shareholders’ assemblies (and therefore minority investors) were given
more decision-making power in companies when capital requirements were
higher, when investors were located far from the productive activities of the
firm and when there was a lack of alternative mechanisms to monitor.
The paper shows that firms can (and do) find substitutes to law-provided
investor protection. Other authors are finding similar results in other civil law
countries. Therefore, firm level analysis can help us to explain why the law and
finance relation does not seem to hold at the end of the 19th century. The results
of this paper (and all the related literature that has been emerging) argue in
favour of the benefit of exploring the history of financial development and its
political economy beyond the «legal origin» hypothesis, if we really want to
understand what the main determinants of financial development are and how
the least developed countries can take steps along this path.
As in the existing literature, I also use a country-level analysis approach.
By focusing on Chile during the 19th century I leave two important questions
which should be the focus of future research unanswered: (1) How similar is
the Chilean case to the rest of Latin America? and (2) Why did Chile not
continue along the path of financial development during the 20th century?
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